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distinct from the jurisdiction exercised by the courts of general juris-
diction. In probate the procedure is more lax than in other fields of
law and the statutes are loosely construed. Strictness and technical
meaning are not always followed where method and procedure are
concerned. It is submitted by the writer that due to the peculiar
nature of probate this is a desirable situation.
J. QUENTIN WES=EY
SUBSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION AS PERTAINING TO
DIE WITHOUT ISSUE
In Howard v. Reynolds' testator apparently drafted his own will
and in very informal language provided for his farm to go to his son
Ellis. He further directed that Ellis should pay a share to another son
within three years and then should borrow money against the land
in order to pay two additional shares to persons named in the will.
Testator also placed a fair value of four thousand dollars on each
share and then wrote: ". .. if any heir was to die without leving [sic.]
an air [sic.] his part should go to the other heirs." A declaratory judg-
ment action was filed for a construction of the will and the chancellor
held that Ellis took a fee simple interest in the land subject to equitable
liens in favor of the other named persons in the amount of four thou-
sand dollars a share. He also held that there should be no defeasance
of these interests upon the death of Ellis without issue surviving him.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky affirmed the chancellor's holding
and in its opinion held that the phrase "die without heirs" created
defeasible interests which would be divested only if death without
issue occurred before the death of the testator. Thus, since the
devisee and the legatees survived the testator, the former took a fee
simple absolute interest in the land subject to equitable liens in the
legatees.
When used in a will to designate a condition of defeasance, the
meaning of the phrase "die without issue" or its equivalent is clearly
a matter of construction. The two possible meanings are: (1) the
testator intended the condition to be death without issue at any time,
or (2) he intended it to be only death without issue prior to his
death. If the latter meaning is adopted, the theory of construction is
that the testator merely intended for the second devisee or legatee to
be substituted for the first devisee or legatee in order to prevent a lapse
should the first taker die without issue before the will takes effect.
2261 S,W, 2d 815 (1953).
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This construction is referred to by the authorities as a "substitutional
construction," if the testator's intention on this point can be determined
from a reading of the will as a whole the court will do so, because its
primary rule of construction is to construe the instrument as a whole.2
Where it is necessary, however, to construe the phrase "die without
issue" alone, substitutional construction becomes in effect a special
rule of construction. Although the opinion of the court in the instant
case does not assert the principle of substitutional construction, it was
clearly applied to the devise of realty and, at least by inference, to the
bequests of personalty in the form of equitable liens. The purpose of
this comment is to examine the Kentucky law of "substitutional con-
struction" in both its applications.
Prior to Harvey v. Bell, decided in 1904, Kentucky law on this
problem was rather confused. In this case the Kentucky court at-
tempted to clarify the meaning of the phrase, "die without issue," by
laying down four rules of construction. The fourth rule is applicable
here:
...where there is no intervening estate, and no other period to
which the words dying without issue can be reasonably referred, they
are held, in the absence of something in the will evidencing a con-
trary intent, to create a defeasible fee which is defeated by the death
of the devisee at any time without issue then living.'
Between 1904 and 1925, several opinions of the court deviated from
the rule of construction established in Harvey v. Bell, by applying sub-
stitutional construction to a devise of realty.4 In Atkinson v. Kern,5
the Kentucky Court of Appeals reaffirmed the rule of Harvey v. Bell
and overruled all decisions in conflict with it, thereby clearly over-
ruling these deviating decisions and repudiating substitutional con-
struction in this application. This would seem to be the minority
view,0 and was the law prior to the decision in the instant case.
Except for the implications the principal case the rule of con-
struction applied to the phrase "die without issue" in regard to per-
sonalty is clearly contra to the rule governing realty in Kentucky.j
The personalty rule was best stated in Ireland v. Coopers as follows:
... when there is no intervening estate, and nothing appears in the
will to the contrary, the presumption as to personalty is that dying
2 Ireland v. Cooper, 211 Ky. 323, 277 S.W. 483 (1925); Muir v. Richardson,
201 Ky. 352, 256 S.W. 727 (1923).
*118 Ky. 512, 523, 81 S.W. 671, 674 (1904).
'Rue v. Lisle, 200 Ky. 520, 255 S.W. 133 (1923); Prewitt v. Prewitt, 178
Ky. 346, 198 S.W. 924 (1917); Calloway v. Calloway, 171 Ky. 366, 188 S.W.
410 1916).
210 Ky 824, 276 S.W. 977 (1925).
616 Ky. L. J. at 81 (1927).
,Poore v. Poore, 226 Ky. 668, 11 S.W. 2d 721 (1928).
a211 Ky. 323, 277 S.W. 483 (1925).
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without issue, has reference to the death of the devisee before the
testator, but as to realty it refers to his death at any time.'
In adopting a rule of substitutional construction in regard to per-
sonalty the Kentucky court has taken the majority position. When the
will directs a separation of the realty and personalty the appropriate
rule applies,' but when there has been no separation of the property,
the court has concluded that the rule governing realty must prevail
and a defeasible estate is created as to both classes of propertyll-for in-
stance, where personalty and realty are devised jointly and also where
both have been placed in the hands of a trustee.
At first glance it might appear that the Kentucky Court of Appeals
in the Howard case reversed its previous decisions in regard to the
rule of construction concerning realty. But a careful reading of the
rule of Harvey v. Bell shows that if there is a contrary intent ex-
pressed in the will, that intent will be given effect. In other words if
the testator, in the instrument as a whole, manifests an intention for
death without issue to have significance regardless of when it occurs,
a substitutional construction will not be attributed to him. In this
sense the Howard case reaffirms the cardinal rule of construction which
has been followed in this jurisdiction for many years to the effect that
the testator's intention must be ascertained from a consideration of
the will as a whole, that is, by looking to the four comers of the in-
strument.
12
In the instant case the language of the whole will is at complete
odds with a construction which would require the devisee's interest
to be defeated at any time by death without issue. The testator surely
did not intend that Ellis should pay the legatees their respective shares
and retain merely a defeasible estate, which would be defeated if he
died without issue at any time. He expressly directed that Ellis was
to own one-half of the worth of the estate after he paid the second son
his share. The testator was a layman and his concept of owning
property implies a complete, unrestricted absolute fee simple title.
This concept is in direct conflict with the technical nature of a de-
feasible title. Even stronger evidence of the testator's intention is
Old. at 326, 277 S.W. at 484.
o Whitlow's Administrator et al. v. Saunder's Administrator, 237 Ky. 842, 36
S.W. 2d 659 (1931).
"In Mitchell v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Company, 283 Ky. 532, 142 S.W.
2d 181 (1940), it was said: "In this case there was no separation of realty and
personalty, both being placed in the hands of the trustee under the same devise
to one person and in these circumstances clearly the real estate rule must prevail
and the clause of the will in controversy must be construed to mean a death of
the daughter at any time without issue."
' Zelia Donelson's Ex'r v. Zelia R. Coates, 299 Ky. 608, 186 S.W. 2d 240
(1945).
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shown by his direction that Ellis was to borrow enough money to pay
the other two legatees their respective shares, pledging the land as
security. This is also at odds with a construction which would create
a defeasible fee, for a lender would not loan money and take as sole
security property in which the mortgagor had only a defeasible fee.
Thus, it can readily be seen how the court, using the paramount rule
of construction, arrived at its conclusion that the words die without
issue in this will meant die without issue before testators death.
As to the equitable liens, which the court properly classified as
personalty (the monetary shares devised to the other legatee's) the
result of the case is in strict conformity with what seems to be the
established rule in Kentucky. 3
It is submitted that there is no rational basis for a distinction
between the rule of construction governing the phrase "die without
issue" as it applies to personalty and as it applies to realty. Although
the court in construing the will in the Howard case correctly reached
the same result with respect to the two types of property, it failed to
reconcile the principles of Harvey v. Bell and Atkinson v. Kern in the
situation where the intent of the testator cannot be determined from
the will as a whole. To this extent the opinion can be interpreted as
continuing to recognize the" existence of different rules for realty and
personalty. In a 1940 case, Haggin.s Trustee et al. v. Haggin,14 the
court inferred that the rule should be the same for both classes of
property. It is submitted that this is the better view and that the
Court of Appeals should adopt it.
WENDELL S. WILLIAMs
WILLS: REMAINDER OVER FOLLOWING PURPORTED FEE
In the recent decision of Collings v. Collings Exrs,' the Kentucky
Court of Appeals applied certain principles of will construction which
it has established for determining the validity or a gift over following
the attempted disposition of a fee simple absolute interest in an
earlier clause of the instrument. In continuing to classify the funda-
Supra note 8.
14283 Ky. 821, 143 S.W. 2d 522 (1940), the court said: "In the Atldnson
opinion and in cases preceding that opinion there is at least an intimation of a
distinction to be drawn as to the interpretation to be given between a case in-
volving the transfer of real property and one involving a transfer of personalty,
but that distinction if it exists, requires a more mandatory adherence to the in-
corporated rules laid down in the Atkinson opinion where the property conveyed
was personalty than where it was realty."
1260 S.W. 2d 935 (Ky. 1953).
